Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Herodotus, Timothy Williamson and Ray Billington
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26 ideas
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9601
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The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137
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If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
21589
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When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson]
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21596
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Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson]
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21601
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A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
21629
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Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson]
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9599
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There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
21591
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Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson]
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21619
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If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson]
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21620
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The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson]
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21622
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If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson]
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9120
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Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson]
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6863
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Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
21614
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The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson]
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21625
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The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson]
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21617
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We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson]
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21618
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If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
21590
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Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
21592
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Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson]
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21603
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You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson]
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21604
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Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson]
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21607
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Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson]
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21608
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Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson]
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21609
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Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson]
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21610
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Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson]
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21613
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Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson]
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