Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lycophron, Willard Quine and Andr Gallois
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24 ideas
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
12210
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Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
10243
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My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
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18438
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Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
19042
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Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
8496
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What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine]
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11101
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General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
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19485
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Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
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10667
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A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
1610
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To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine]
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19486
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We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
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5747
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"No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia]
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16963
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Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
16021
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Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan]
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16964
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Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
8459
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Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein]
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8497
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An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine]
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3325
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For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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4216
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Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe]
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18966
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Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine]
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18964
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Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
16261
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If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
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7698
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If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
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19492
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Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
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14490
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You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine]
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