Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury and Jody Azzouni
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10 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
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12447
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That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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16064
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
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12445
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If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
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12449
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Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
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12440
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If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
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12438
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In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
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12441
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We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
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