Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Alex Oliver and Nelson Goodman

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

11 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17656 Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
17661 We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
17659 Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
17657 We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
10747 Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver]
10748 Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
17654 A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]