Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Chris Daly and Gareth Evans
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8 ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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16064
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
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16129
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Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
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16459
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Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
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16460
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Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
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16457
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There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
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