Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, David J.Chalmers and Alexander Bird

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13 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird]
Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories [Bird]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers]