Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, David J.Chalmers and Jonathan Schaffer
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18 ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
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13748
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Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
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17304
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As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
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17306
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If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
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14599
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Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
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13747
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Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
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2392
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Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
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2393
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Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
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2394
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Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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2398
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Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
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13744
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The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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16048
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Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
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16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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16064
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
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10367
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There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
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2401
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All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
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13739
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Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
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