Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Immanuel Kant and M.R. Ayers
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12 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
4475
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Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept [Kant]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520
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Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
7416
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Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot on Kant]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
19386
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Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear [Kant]
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21445
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Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves [Kant]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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16064
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
21448
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Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced [Kant]
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5554
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Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws [Kant]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
6160
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Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands on Kant]
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