Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, John Searle and Saunders MacLane
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11 ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
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Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle]
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Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
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Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
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Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle]
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Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin]
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle]
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