Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Peter Geach, Gottfried Leibniz and Gareth Evans
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10 ideas
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
12741
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If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz]
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12740
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The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz]
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13184
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The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
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13188
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The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
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Only unities have any reality [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
16129
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Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
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16459
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Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
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16460
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Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
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16457
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There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
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13187
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In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
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