Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Peter Geach, Gottfried Leibniz and Yuval Noah Harari
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38 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
12319
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What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
12932
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The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
19400
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Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz]
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19401
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God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz]
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7696
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Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette]
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19341
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There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz]
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19428
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Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz]
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5062
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First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19393
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What is not active is nothing [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
12922
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A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
19405
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Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz]
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7565
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Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley]
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5044
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Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz]
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13174
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A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz]
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13175
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Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz]
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12747
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Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz]
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12748
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Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz]
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5060
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All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz]
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19377
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A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz]
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19385
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All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz]
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12774
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Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
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12777
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Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
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12782
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Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
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7644
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The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz]
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11857
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He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
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7843
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Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz]
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12751
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It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz]
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19363
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Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz]
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19352
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A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
12966
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Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
12741
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If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz]
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12740
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The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz]
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13184
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The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
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13188
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The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
12752
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Only unities have any reality [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
13187
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In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
12993
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Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
12989
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Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz]
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