Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Plotinus, R Keefe / P Smith and Alex Oliver
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19 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
21812
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Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus]
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21817
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The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus]
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21824
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The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
21813
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Number determines individual being [Plotinus]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9064
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Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
9044
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If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
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9048
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The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
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9055
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The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9049
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Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
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9056
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Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
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9058
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Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
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9059
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The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
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9060
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Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
9050
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A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
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9061
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People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
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9062
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If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
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9063
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How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
10747
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Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver]
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10748
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Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver]
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