Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stephen P. Stich, R Keefe / P Smith and James Baillie

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13 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality

9064	Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance

9044	If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]

9048	The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]

9055	The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness

9049	Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]

9056	Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]

9058	Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]

9059	The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]

9060	Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness

9050	A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]

9061	People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]

9062	If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]

9063	How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]