Combining Philosophers
Ideas for W Wimsatt/W Beardsley, Gareth Evans and Dale Jacquette
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11 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
7707
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To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
7692
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Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette]
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7687
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Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
7679
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Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
16129
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Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
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16459
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Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
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16457
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There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
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16460
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Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
7678
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Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
7683
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Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette]
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7684
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Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette]
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