Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Wilhelm Dilthey, J Ladyman / D Ross and Amie L. Thomasson
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10 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
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14942
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Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross]
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14493
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Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
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14948
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To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
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14947
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Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
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14941
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We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
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10493
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If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross]
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14934
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Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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14909
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Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
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14491
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Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
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14489
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Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
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