Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Willard Quine, Posidonius and Ned Markosian
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
38 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
10241
|
For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro]
|
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
16966
|
Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine]
|
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
4064
|
The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane]
|
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19277
|
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
|
16965
|
All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine]
|
1633
|
Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine]
|
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
11092
|
A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine]
|
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8205
|
Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time [Quine]
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
11093
|
We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine]
|
1630
|
We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine]
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
16939
|
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
12210
|
Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
10243
|
My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
|
18438
|
Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
19042
|
Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
8496
|
What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine]
|
11101
|
General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
|
19485
|
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
|
10667
|
A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
1610
|
To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine]
|
19486
|
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
|
5747
|
"No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia]
|
16963
|
Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
16021
|
Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan]
|
16964
|
Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
8459
|
Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein]
|
8497
|
An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine]
|
3325
|
For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
|
4216
|
Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe]
|
18966
|
Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine]
|
18964
|
Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
16261
|
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
|
7698
|
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
|
19492
|
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
|
14490
|
You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine]
|
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
16961
|
In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine]
|
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
16462
|
The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine]
|
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
11096
|
Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine]
|