17954
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Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
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Full Idea:
Essence is, as it were, necessity rooted in things, ...but how about possibility rooted in things? ...Having the potential to Φ, unlike being essentially Φ, does not entail being actually Φ.
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From:
Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §2)
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A reaction:
To me this invites the question 'what is it about the entity which endows it with its rooted possibilities?' A thing has possibilities because it has a certain nature (at a given time).
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19021
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I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
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Full Idea:
I do not have the ability to play the violin. Nor does my desk. Unlike my desk, however, I possess the ability to learn to play the violin - the ability, that is, to acquire the ability to play the violin. I have an 'iterated ability' to play the violin.
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From:
Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.6)
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A reaction:
An important idea, though the examples are more likely to come from human behaviour than from the non-human physical world.
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19016
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We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter]
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Full Idea:
We should think in terms of dispositions in terms of the manifestation alone - not as a disposition to ...if..., but as a disposition to ..., full stop.
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From:
Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.7)
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A reaction:
This way of individuating dispositions seems plausible. Some dispositions only have one trigger, but others have many. All sorts of things are inclined to trigger a human smile, but we are just disposed to smile. Some people smile at disasters.
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