Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, Sigmund Freud and Gottlob Frege

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3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P]
     Full Idea: Frege urges us to regard properties as just a special kind of function, and in the case of numerical properties he comes close to identifying a property with its characteristic function.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 11.3 n 5
     A reaction: Every now and then really interesting bits of metaphysics pop out of Frege, though it usually needs commentators to show the implications. Does the 'characteristic' imply a teleological view?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
     Full Idea: Frege's theory of properties (which he calls 'concepts') yields too few properties, by identifying coextensive properties, and also too many, by letting every predicate express a property.
     From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §2
     A reaction: Seems right; one extension may have two properties (have heart/kidneys), two predicates might express the same property. 'Cutting nature at the joints' covers properties as well as objects.
It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale]
     Full Idea: Expositors of Frege's views have disagreed over whether abstract qualities are to be reckoned among his objects.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892]) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.2.II
     A reaction: [he cites Dummett 1973:70-80, and Wright 1983:25-8] There seems to be a danger here of a collision between Fregean verbal approaches to ontological commitment and the traditional views about universals. No wonder they can't decide.