7703
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If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
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Full Idea:
If classes alone cannot be eliminated from ontology on Quine's terms, and if classes are defined as property combinations, then neither are all properties, universals in the tradition sense, entirely eliminable.
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From:
Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 9)
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A reaction:
If classes were totally conventional (and there was no such things as a 'natural' class) then you might admit something to a class without knowing its properties (as 'the thing in the box').
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10511
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It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale]
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Full Idea:
The traditional conception of universals, resting as it does upon the idea that some single type of entity is picked out by expressions of such radically different logical types as predicates and abstract nouns, is of doubtful coherence.
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From:
Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3 Intro)
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A reaction:
A striking case of linguistic metaphysics in action. I don't believe in universals, but I don't find this persuasive, as our capacity to express the same proposition by means of extremely varied syntax is obvious. Is 'horse' an abstract noun?
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10310
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Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale]
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Full Idea:
Objections to Frege's argument for abstract objects: that the objects would not have the right sort of independence; that we could have no knowledge of them; that the singular term statements can't be had; that thoughts of abstracta can't be identified.
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From:
Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.1)
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A reaction:
[compressed] [See Idea 10309 for the original argument] It is helpful to have this list, even if Hale rejects them all. They are also created but then indestructible, and exist in unlimited profusion, and seem relative to a language. Etc!
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