Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Ren Descartes and Wolfgang Knne

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3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: In one of his last letters Descartes describes incorporeal substances as 'powers or forces'.
     From: report of René Descartes (Two letters on mind [1649], Feb 1649) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.4
     A reaction: Only a glimmer, but I really like this idea. (Ellis flirts with it somewhere). Minds are deeply and intrinsically active things. Try ceasing to think for five minutes. Apparently 12th century Cistercian authors were keen on the idea.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
     Full Idea: There are no powers in stones and plants that are not so mysterious that they cannot be explained …from principles that are known to all and admitted by all, namely the shape, size, position, and motion of particles of matter.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], IV.187), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
     A reaction: This is an invocation of 'categorical' properties, against dispositions. I take this to be quite wrong. The explanation goes the other way. What supports the structures; what drives the motion; what initiates anything?
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
     Full Idea: Using dispositional analyses in aid of ontological reductions is what empiricism taught us. If you are down on cats, reduce them to permanent possibilities of sensation; if you are down on electrons, reduce them to possibilities of experimental outcome.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1)
     A reaction: The cats line is phenomenalism; the electrons line is instrumentalism. I like this as a serious warning about dispositions, even where they seem most plausible, as in the disposition of glass to break when struck. Why is it thus disposed?