display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
55 ideas
17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I believe that nothing is genuinely related to itself. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.7) |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
Full Idea: Armstrong takes properties to be universals, and believes there are no 'uninstantiated' universals. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §9.3 | |
A reaction: At first glance this, like many theories of universals, seems to invite Ockham's Razor. If they are always instantiated, perhaps we should perhaps just try to talk about the instantiations (i.e. tropes), and skip the universal? |
17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A property ...is something which is strictly identical, strictly the same, in all its different instances. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
A reaction: Some is gravitation one property, or an infinity of properties, for each of its values? What is the same between objects of different mass. I sort of believe in all the masses, but I'm not sure what 'mass' is. Abstraction, say I. |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Armstrong has a distinctive conception of (fundamental) properties as contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by David Lewis - A world of truthmakers? p.220 | |
A reaction: Armstrong tries to get a naturalistically founded platonism (which he claims is Aristotelian), but the idea that one thing can be multiply located strikes me as daft (especially if the number of its locations increases or decreases). |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The ontological correlates of true law-statements must involve properties. How else can one pick our the uniformities which the law-statements entail? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], 1) | |
A reaction: I'm unconvinced about the 'laws', but I have to admit that it is hard to know how to describe the relevant bits of nature without some family of concepts covered by the word 'property'. I'm in favour of taking some of the family into care, though. |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The 'thing itself' seems not be a minimal truthmaker for the thing having its particular mass. ...The thing has a great many other properties. ...It seems entirely reasonable to postulate that the object has properties that are objectively there. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.2) | |
A reaction: This is Armstrong using the truthmaker principle to argue for the existence of properties (as instantiated universals). I like truthmakers, but truths do not have enough precision in their parts for us to read off reality from them. |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A set of determinates under the one determinable are incompatible by definition. If an object is not one mile in length, then its actual length will be incompatible with being one mile in length. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is a much better general version of the standard example 'if it is red it can't be green'. Armstrong uses it to give a more precise account of incompatibility. Useful. |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Length is a 'determinable' property; being some particular length, such as a mile, is one of its 'determinates'. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.1) | |
A reaction: The seem to be 'type' and 'token' properties, except that this other vocabulary indicates the link between them. |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Armstrong says all properties are categorical, but a dispositional predicate may denote such a property; the dispositional predicate denotes the categorical property in virtue of the dispositional role it happens, contingently, to play in this world. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1 | |
A reaction: I favour the fundamentality of the dispositional rather than the categorical. The world consists of powers, and we find ourselves amidst their categorical expressions. I could be persuaded otherwise, though! |
12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
Full Idea: I am against Armstrong's strong categoricalism, that is, the thesis that all basic properties are categorical. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Brian Ellis - The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism 3 | |
A reaction: I certainly agree with this, as I cannot see where the power would come from to get the whole thing off the ground. Armstrong depends on universals to necessitate what happens, which I find very peculiar. |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Evading properties by means of predicates is implausible when things change. If a cold thing becomes hot, first 'cold' applies, and then 'hot', but what have predicates to do with the temperature of an object? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1) | |
A reaction: A clear illustration of why properties are part of nature, not just part of language. But some applications of predicates are more arbitrary than this (ugly, cool) |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Upholders of properties have been inclined to postulate a distinct property corresponding to each distinct predicate. We could start by eliminating all those properties where the predicate fails to apply, is not true, of anything. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1) | |
A reaction: This would leave billions of conjunctional, disjunctional and gerrymandered properties where the predicate applies very well. We are all 'on the same planet as New York'. Am I allowed to say that I 'wish' that a was F? He aims for 'sparse' properties. |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Exact similarity is a symmetrical and transitive relation. (Less than exact similarity is not transitive, even for tropes). So the relation of exact similarity is an equivalence relation, partitioning the field of tropes into equivalence classes. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §2) | |
A reaction: Armstrong goes on the explore the difficulties for trope theory of less than exact similarity, which is a very good line of discussion. Unfortunately it is a huge problem for everyone, apart from the austere nominalist. |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There is a 'moderate' nominalism (found in G.F.Stout, for example) which says that properties and relations do exist, but that they are particulars rather than universals. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504) | |
A reaction: Both this view and the 'mereological' view seem to be ducking the problem. If you have two red particulars and a green one, how do we manage to spot the odd one out? |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: 'Non-transferable' theories of tropes hold that the mass is of this stone by necessity. It is an identity condition for the property. Every property then becomes an essential property. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Martin and Heil for this view] It is hard to see in this proposal how the trope is in any way separate from its substance, and hence it seems a bit of a vacuous theory. (The other theories of properties aren't much cop either). |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Trope theory needs extra ontological baggage, the Axioms of Resemblance. There is a principle of symmetry, and there is the failure of transitivity - except in the special case of exact resemblance. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §2) | |
A reaction: [see text for fuller detail] Is it appropriate to describe such axioms as 'ontological' baggage? Interesting, though I suspect that any account of properties and predicates will have a similar baggage of commitments. |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The view that properties exist, but are particulars rather than universals, is still left with the problem of classification. On what basis do we declare that different things have the same property? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504) | |
A reaction: This seems like a fairly crucial objection. The original problem was how we manage to classify things (group them into sets), and it looks as if this theory leaves the problem untouched. |
17011 | I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton] |
Full Idea: Many things lead me to a suspicion that all phenomena may depend on certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by causes not yet known, either are impelled toward one another and cohere in regular figures,or are repelled from one another and recede. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Principia Mathematica [1687], Pref) | |
A reaction: For Newton, forces are not just abstractions that are convenient for mathematics, but realities which I would say are best described as 'powers'. |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Properties are not powers. But properties have powers. They bestow powers. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
A reaction: I think this is the wrong way round. In this view, powers become extremely vague things, ranging from the fine-grained to the hugely broad. It seems to me that powers are precise and real, but properties are the vague unhelpful things. |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is only to the extent that we relate disposition to 'categorical basis', and difference of disposition to difference of 'categorical basis', that we can speak of dispositions. We must be Realists, not Phenomenalists, about dispositions. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968], 6.VI) | |
A reaction: It is Armstrong's realism which motivates this claim, because he thinks only categorical properties are real. But categorical properties seem to be passive, and the world is active. |
17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Actualism ...debars us from admitting into our ontology the merely possible, not only the merely logically possible, but also the merely physically possible. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.3) | |
A reaction: This is the big metaphysical question for fans (like myself) of 'powers' in nature. Armstrong declares himself an Actualist. I take it as obvious that the actual world contains powers, but how are we to characterise them? |
17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is not denied that statements attributing dispositions and/or powers to objects are often true. But the truth-makers or ontological ground for such statements must always be found in the actual, or categorical, properties of the objects involved. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.3) | |
A reaction: This is the big debate in the topic of powers. I love powers, but you always think there must be 'something' which has the power. Could reality entirely consist of powers? See Fetzer. |
17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I believe reducing all universals to powers is involved in vicious regress. The power is what it is by the sort of actualisations it gives rise to in suitable sorts of circumstances. But they themselves can be nothing but powers... | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 08.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed wording] I don't see this problem. Anything postulated as fundamental is going to be baffling. Why are categorical properties superior to powers? Postulate basic powers (or basic empowered stuff), then build up. |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Powers must surely issue in manifestations that are something more than just powers. A world where potency never issued in act, but only in more potency, would be one where one travelled without ever having the possibility of arriving. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
A reaction: Tricky. The picture I favour is that the distinction between powers and categorical properties is a misunderstanding. What is fundamental is active and powerful categoricals. |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: If masses are powers, the forces generated between two particulars have to vary inversely with the square of their distance apart. Have not the masses got to 'know' at what distance they are from each other, to exert the right amount of force? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
A reaction: This seems like a good warning against a simplistic account of powers doing all the work, but I suspect that more sophisticated physics would offer the fan of powers a solution here. The power is to 'spread' the force around. |
17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Universals can be brought into the spatio-temporal world, becoming simply the repeatable features of that world. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
A reaction: I wish Armstrong wouldn't use the word 'universal', which has so much historical baggage. The world obviously has repeatable features, but does that mean that our ontology must include things called 'features'? Hm. |
8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3) | |
A reaction: Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here! |
4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Should we decide what universals exist a priori (probably on semantic grounds, identifying them with the meanings of general words), or a posteriori (looking to our best general theories about nature to give revisable conjectures about universals)? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.505) | |
A reaction: Nice question for a realist. Although the problem is first perceived in the use of language, if we think universals are a real feature of nature, we should pursue them scientifically, say I. |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
Full Idea: Armstrong thinks universals play two roles, namely grounding objective resemblances and grounding causal powers. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11 | |
A reaction: Personally I don't think universals explain anything at all. They just add another layer of confusion to a difficult problem. Oliver objects that this seems a priori, contrary to Armstrong's principle in Idea 10728. |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A reason why I reject trope theory is that universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §2) | |
A reaction: This is the key thought in Armstrong's defence of universals. Issues about universals may well be decided on such large playing fields. I think he is probably wrong, and I will gradually explain why. Watch this space as the story unfolds... |
4032 | The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The problem of universals is the problem of how numerically different particulars can nevertheless be identical in nature, all be of the same 'type'. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Nominalism and Realism [1978], p.41), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §7 | |
A reaction: A nice statement of the problem. As usual, the question is whether the 'sameness' is a feature of nature, or a product of human thought |
17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A Realistic version of a Regularity theory of laws will have to postulate universals. How else will it be possible to say that the different instances of a certain uniformity are all instances of objectively the same phenomenon? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.4) | |
A reaction: I disagree. We may (or may not) need properties, but they can be have a range. We just need stable language. We use one word 'red', even when the shade of redness varies. Non-realists presumably refer to sense-data. |
15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Armstrong takes universals generally, and structural universals along with the rest, to be abstractions from their particular instances. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], p.83-4) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'The pictorial' | |
A reaction: To me, 'abstracted' implies a process of human psychology, a way of thinking about the instances. I don't see how there can be an 'abstracted' relation which is a part of the external world. That makes his laws of nature human creations. |
17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Past, present and future I take to be all and equally real. A universal need not be instantiated now. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
A reaction: This is the price you must pay for saying that you only believe in universals which are instantiated. |
17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Universals are abstractions from states of affairs. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 7) | |
A reaction: I'm getting confused about Armstrong's commitments. He bases his whole theory on the existence of universals (repeatable features), but now says those are 'abstracted' from something else. Abstracted by us? |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There are some who claim that there can be uninstantiated universals, which are not exemplified by any particular, past, present or future; this would certainly imply that those universals have a Platonic transcendent existence outside time and space. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is potentially circular or defeasible, because one can deny the universal simply because there is no particular. |
4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Modern upholders of universals generally reject self-predication; humanity is not a man, whiteness is not a white thing. This means that the Third Man argument does not constitute a difficulty. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals and Particulars [1995], p.506) | |
A reaction: This certainly seems right, and is relevant to the modern problem of the content of thought. The idea of a tree does not need to be tree-like. |
8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A philosophical account of a general sort is required of what it is for different tokens to be of the same type. To refuse to give such an account is to be a metaphysical ostrich. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §1) | |
A reaction: This defines Ostrich Nominalism (a label Armstrong aims at Quine). I certainly sympathise with Armstrong. If there is no more to a class (a type) than just having members (tokens), nothing is explain. What is natural, essential, intensional etc.? |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The great deniers of properties and relations are of two sorts: those who put their faith in predicates and those who appeal to sets (classes). | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1) | |
A reaction: This ignores the Quine view, which is strictly for ostriches. Put like this, properties and relations seem undeniable. Predicates are too numerous (gerrymandering) or too few (colour shades). Classes can have arbitrary members. |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is difficult for Resemblance Nominalists to construct their interconnected classes in practice. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: Given the complexity of the world this is hardly surprising, but it doesn't seem insuperable for the theory. It is hard to decide whether an object is white, or hot, whatever your theory of universals. |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: If a resembles b, in general, they resemble in certain respects, and fail to resemble in other respects. But respects are uncomfortably close to properties, which the Resemblance theory proposes to do without. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1) | |
A reaction: This is a good objection. I think it is plausible to build a metaphysics around the idea of respects, and drop properties. Shall we just talk of 'respects' for categorising, and 'powers' for causation and explanation? Respects only exist in comparisons. |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalists say that to have a property is to be a member of a class which is part of a network of resemblance relations with other classes of particulars. ..'Resemblance' is taken to be a primitive notion, though one that admits of degrees. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: Intuition suggests that this proposal has good prospects, as properties are neither identical, nor just particulars, but have a lot in common, which 'resemblance' captures. Hume saw resemblance as a 'primitive' process. |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I suggest that we reject the notion that just because the predicate 'red' applies to an open class of particulars, therefore there must be a property, redness. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], p.8), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §6 | |
A reaction: At last someone sensible (an Australian) rebuts that absurd idea that our ontology is entirely a feature of our language |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: To appreciate the implausibility of the predicate view, consider where a thing's properties change. 'Hot' becomes applicable when 'cold' ceases to, ..but the change in the object would have occurred if the predicates had never existed. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1) | |
A reaction: They keep involving secondary qualities! Armstrong is taking a strongly realist view (fine by me), but anti-realists can ignore his argument. I take predicate nominalism to be a non-starter. |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The properties that are of ontological interest are those constituents of objects, of particulars, which serve as the ground in the objects for the application of predicates. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1) | |
A reaction: Good. This is a reversal of the predicate nominalist approach, and is a much healthier attitude to the relationship between ontology and language. Value judgements will be an interesting case. Does this allow us to invent new predicates? |
4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: For a Predicate Nominalist different things have the same property, or belong to the same kind, if the same predicates applies to, or is 'true of', the different things. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: This immediately strikes me as unlikely, because I think the action is at the proposition level, not the sentence level. And why do some predicates seem to be synonymous? |
4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The standard objections to Predicate and Concept Nominalism are that some properties have no predicates or concepts, and that predicates and concepts seem to be types rather than particulars, and it is types the theory is seeking to analyse. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: The claim that some properties have no concepts is devastating if true, but may not be. The regress problem is likely to occur in any explanation of universals, I suspect. |
4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Concept Nominalism says different things have the same property, or belong to the same kind, if the same concept in the mind is applied to different things. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: This is more appealing than Predicate Nominalism, and may be right. Our perception of the 'properties' of a thing may be entirely dictated by human interests, not by nature. |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Most sets are uninteresting because they are utterly heterogeneous, that is, the members have nothing in common. For most sets there is no common property F, such that the set is the set of all the Fs. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1) | |
A reaction: One might link the interesting sets together by resemblance, without invoking the actual existence of an item F which all the members carry (like freemasons' briefcases). Personally I am only really interested in 'natural' sets. |
4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Class Nominalism can be defended (by Quinton) against the problem of random sets (with nothing in common), by giving an account of properties in terms of 'natural' classes, where 'natural' comes in degrees, but is fundamental and unanalysable. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: This still seems to beg the question, because you still have to decide whether two things have anything 'naturally' in common before you assign them to a set. |
4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Class Nominalists substitute classes or sets for properties or kinds, so that being white is just being a member of the set of white things; relations are treated as ordered sets. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: This immediately seems wrong, because it invites the question of why something is a member of a set (unless membership is arbitrary and whimsical - which it usually isn't). |
4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Class Nominalism cannot explain co-extensive properties (which qualify the same things), and also a random (non-natural) set has particulars with nothing in common, thus failing to capture an essential feature of a general property. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: These objections strike me as conclusive, since we can assign things to a set quite arbitrarily, so membership of a set may signify no shared property at all (except, say, 'owned by me', which is hardly a property). |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: For a Class Nominalist 'the class of all 4-kilo objects' is the truthmaker for the truth that the particular has just that mass. Yet this looks far too big! Would not the object still be four kilos even if the other members of the class had never existed? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.2) | |
A reaction: This seems so obvious to me as to be hardly worth saying. To identify redness with the class of red entities just seems crazy. Why do they belong in that class? Armstrong is illustrating the value of the truthmaker idea in philosophy. |
4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Mereological Nominalism views a property as the omnitemporal whole or aggregate of all the things said to have the property, so whiteness is a huge white object whose parts are all the white things. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: A charming proposal, in which bizarre and beautiful unities thread themselves across the universe, but white objects may also be soft and warm. |
4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Mereological Nominalism has some plausibility for a case like whiteness, but breaks down completely for other universals, such as squareness. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.503) | |
A reaction: A delightful request that you attempt a hopeless feat of imagination, by seeing all squares as parts of one supreme square. A nice objection. |