display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
6 ideas
15456 | Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Kim suggest that 'extrinsic' properties are those that imply 'accompaniment' (coexisting with some wholly distinct contingent object), whereas 'intrinsic' properties are compatible with 'loneliness' (being un-accompanied). | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Psychophysical supervenience [1982], 9th pg) by David Lewis - Extrinsic Properties II | |
A reaction: The aim of Kim and Lewis is to get the ontological commitment down to a minimum - in this case just to objects (and mysterious 'implications'!). I like nominalism, but you can't just deny properties. 'Loneliness' is extrinsic! |
3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
Full Idea: Resemblance or similarity is the very core of our concept of a property. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.219) |
3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Emergent properties are said to be irreducible to, and unpredictable from, the lower-level phenomena from which they emerge (as weight is a 'resultant' property, but the transparency of water is an 'emergent' property). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.228) | |
A reaction: So weight is predictable, but transparency is a surprise? But presumably the transparency of water is totally predictable, once you understand it. Emergent properties are either dualist or reducible, in my view. |
2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
Full Idea: Macroproperties can, and in general do, have their own causal powers, powers that go beyond the causal powers of their microconstituents. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §3 p.085) | |
A reaction: I don't see why the macro-powers 'go beyond' the sum of the micro-powers. Admittedly one molecule can't be slippery, but slipperiness can be totally reduced to molecule behaviour. |
3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
Full Idea: For the emergentist why pain emerges when C-fibres are excited remains a mystery (a 'brute fact'), but such properties then take on a life of their own as 'downward causation'. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.229) | |
A reaction: I don't think there are any 'brute facts', except perhaps at the lowest level of physics. Whatever happened to the principle of sufficient reason? Is the mind like God - a causal source which is uncaused? |
3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Arguably, properties must be individuated in terms of their causal powers. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.230) |