Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Marga Reimer, Plato and Mary Wollstonecraft

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45 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato]
     Full Idea: It takes a man to understand by the use of universals, and to collect out of the multiplicity of sense-impressions a unity arrived at by a process of reason.
     From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 249b)
You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
     Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d)
The plurality of beautiful things must belong to a single class, because they have a single particular character [Plato]
     Full Idea: All the things we refer to as pluralities (e.g. beautiful things) we also count as belonging to a single class by virtue of the fact that they have a single particular character.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 507b)
If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
     Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Good thinkers spot forms spread through things, or included within some larger form [Plato]
     Full Idea: It takes dialectic to divide things by kinds...such a person can discriminate a single form spread through a lot of separate things…and forms included in a single outside form…or a form connected as a unit through many wholes.
     From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 253d)
     A reaction: [compressed] This is very helpful in indicating the complex structure of the Forms that Plato envisages. If you talk of the meanings of words (other than names), though, it comes to the same thing. Wise people fully understand their language.
We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato]
     Full Idea: We must have some previous knowledge of equality, before the time when we saw equal things, but realised that they fell short of it.
     From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 075a)
Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
     Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118
Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik]
     Full Idea: According to Diotima, the Forms are the objects of desire operative in philosophical discourse.
     From: report of Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210a4-) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.199
When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6
Craftsmen making furniture refer to the form, but no one manufactures the form of furniture [Plato]
     Full Idea: The manufacture of beds and tables involves the craftsman looking to the form and then making the furniture. The form itself is not manufactured by anyone.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 596b)
It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
     Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d)
The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
     Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e)
The not-beautiful is part of the beautiful, though opposed to it, and is just as real [Plato]
     Full Idea: So 'the not beautiful' turns out to be ..both marked off within one kind of those that are, and also set over against one of those that are, ..and the beautiful is no more a being than the not beautiful.
     From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 257d)
     A reaction: [dialogue eliminated] This is a highly significant passage, for two reasons. It suggests that the Form of the beautiful can have parts, and also that the negations of Forms are Forms themselves (both of which come as a surprise).
Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas]
     Full Idea: In the ancient world Plato's Theory of Forms was mostly seen as one aspect of Plato's 'physics' or theory of the world (rather than as 'metaphysics').
     From: report of Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction Ch.5
     A reaction: This is how I also see the theory, but then I am inclined to see religion as a rather startling branch of speculative physics. Annas cites 'Timaeus' as the key text for this.
Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato]
     Full Idea: Whenever the maker of anything keeps his eye on the eternally unchanging and uses it as his pattern for the form and function of his product the result must be good.
     From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28b)
In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato]
     Full Idea: In addition to an eternal unchanging model and a visible and changing copy of reality, there must be a third part, the receptacle and nurse of all becoming and change.
     From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 49b)
     A reaction: cf Aristotle's criticism in Metaphysics
For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato]
     Full Idea: If intelligence and true opinion are different, then the forms must exist, but if they are the same, then what our senses perceive must be the most certain reality.
     From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 51d)
Plato's Forms are said to have no location in space [Plato, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Plato claims that the Forms are not beyond the heavens, because they are not anywhere.
     From: report of Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 203a09
     A reaction: This is an important corrective to caricature accounts of Plato's Forms (encouraged, I'm afraid, by 'Phaedrus'), when critics talk about 'Platonic Heaven'. Forms are not part of space-time. I like the view that they are hypothetical truths.
We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato]
     Full Idea: What overpowering love knowledge would inspire if it could bring a clear image of itself before our sight, and the same may be said of the other forms.
     From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 250d)
     A reaction: the motivation in Plato's theory
If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d)
If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
     Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c)
Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
     Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e)
Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15
     A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle?
Forms are not universals, as they don't cover every general term [Plato, by Annas]
     Full Idea: Despite a widely misinterpreted passage in the Republic, Plato does not think that there is a Form for every general term; Forms are not what came to be called universals.
     From: report of Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction Ch.5
     A reaction: Hm. This is a bit of a blow to someone who has catalogued Platonic Forms under 'Universals'. See also Idea 12042, for what Annas thinks Plato may really have had in mind.
Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
     A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato]
     Full Idea: Our basic description of the universe contained an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it.
     From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 48e)
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
     Full Idea: If man is one, and the good is one, how are they supposed to exist? Do they stay the same even though they are found in many things at the same time, and are they then entirely separated from themselves, which seems most impossible of all?
     From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15a)
     A reaction: Presumably Plato anguishes over this because he thinks Forms are self-predicating (the Good is good). Big mistake. The Good fathers good particulars which resemble itself, but are diluted?
There is only one source for all beauty [Plato]
     Full Idea: If anything is beautiful other than beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason but because it participates in that beautiful.
     From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 100c)
     A reaction: The Greek word will be 'kalon' (beautiful, fine, noble). Like Aristotle, I find it baffling that such diversity could have a single source. Beautiful things have diverse aims.
Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato]
     Full Idea: The reason why other things are called after the forms is that they participate in the forms.
     From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102a)
Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
     Full Idea: Are fine things different from or identical to fineness? They are different from fineness itself, but fineness itself is in a sense present in each of them.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 301a)
If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a
Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
     Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a)
The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
     Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a)
If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
     Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c)
A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato]
     Full Idea: We always postulate a single form for each set of particular things, to which we apply the same name.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 596a)
     A reaction: This implies that the Forms have a great deal in common with the things, but also hints at the possibility of the Form being quite different from the particular things.
Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
     Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b)
If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
     Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a)
If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
     Full Idea: If someone asked me 'Is justice itself just or unjust?' I should answer that it was just, wouldn't you? I agree.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 330c)
If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b
If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
     Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Plato mistakenly thought forms were totally abstracted away from matter [Bacon on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato lost the real fruit of his opinion, by considering forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined and determined by matter.
     From: comment on Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE]) by Francis Bacon - The Advancement of Learning II.VII.5
     A reaction: This thought is roughly what got me interested in abstraction, on which you will find many ideas in this database. Research into Bacon's thought is hampered by that fact that the logicians have hijacked abstraction in recent philosophy.
Plato's Forms not only do not come from the senses, but they are beyond possibility of sensing [Plato, by Kant]
     Full Idea: In Plato's use of the expression 'idea' we can see that he understood by it something that not only could never be borrowed from the senses, but even goes beyond the concepts of the understanding, since nothing in experience could be congruent to it.
     From: report of Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason B370
     A reaction: This is why Kant is not a Platonist - because he thinks the limits of our world are the limits of our capacity for possible experience, and Platonic Forms exceed that limit. Personally I am with Plato. I'll never experience a quark either.
The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a
A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a