display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
10032 | 'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Any relation will yield a new relation, called the 'ancestral', which is the iterated relation which leads up to it, as when 'x is the parent of y' can lead us to the relation 'x is an ancestor of y' | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §79) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This idea is one of Frege's notable discoveries. The ancestral seems to be a generalisation of a given relation. |
10606 | Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P] |
Full Idea: Frege urges us to regard properties as just a special kind of function, and in the case of numerical properties he comes close to identifying a property with its characteristic function. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 11.3 n 5 | |
A reaction: Every now and then really interesting bits of metaphysics pop out of Frege, though it usually needs commentators to show the implications. Does the 'characteristic' imply a teleological view? |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege's theory of properties (which he calls 'concepts') yields too few properties, by identifying coextensive properties, and also too many, by letting every predicate express a property. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §2 | |
A reaction: Seems right; one extension may have two properties (have heart/kidneys), two predicates might express the same property. 'Cutting nature at the joints' covers properties as well as objects. |
10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
Full Idea: Expositors of Frege's views have disagreed over whether abstract qualities are to be reckoned among his objects. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892]) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.2.II | |
A reaction: [he cites Dummett 1973:70-80, and Wright 1983:25-8] There seems to be a danger here of a collision between Fregean verbal approaches to ontological commitment and the traditional views about universals. No wonder they can't decide. |
10533 | We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Frege is denying that on a traditional basis we can construct a workable semantics for a language; we can't regard terms like 'wisdom' as standing for the very same thing as the predicate 'x is wise' stands for. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14 | |
A reaction: This follows from Idea 10532, indicating how to deal with the problem of universals. So predicates refer to concepts, and singular terms to objects. But I see no authoritative way of deciding which is which, given that paraphrases are possible. |