display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We typically count things as red just if they have a property that interacts with normal human beings to make the object look red in such a way that their so looking counts as a presentation of the property to normal humans. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is Jackson's careful statement of the 'Australian' primary property view of colours. He is trying to make red a real property of objects, but personally I take the mention of 'normal' humans as a huge danger sign. Nice try, but no. See Idea 5456. |
8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
Full Idea: It is not always possible for nominalists to translate all statements putatively about universals as statements about particulars. It is not possible for 'red is a colour' and 'red resembles pink more than blue' | |
From: Frank Jackson (Statements about Universals [1977], p.89) | |
A reaction: His second example strikes me as the biggest challenge facing nominalism. I wish they wouldn't use secondary qualities as examples. I am unconvinced that the existence of universals will improve the explanation. It's a mystery. |
8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Some red things resemble some blue things more than some pink things because of factors other than colour. Nominalists must offer 'anything red colour-resembles anything pink', but that may contain a universal in disguise. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Statements about Universals [1977], p.90) | |
A reaction: Hume and Quine are probably right that we spot resemblances instantly, and only articulate the respect of the resemblance at a later stage. |