Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, David Lewis and Crates (Theb)
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53 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15751
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Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
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8571
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Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
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15735
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Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
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9656
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The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
15737
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To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14979
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Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
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15454
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Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
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15742
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A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis]
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15397
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If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
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15398
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Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
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15435
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If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
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15400
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We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron]
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15458
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A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis]
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15459
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Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis]
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15741
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All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15752
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We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
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10717
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Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
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16217
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Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
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8613
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Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
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8585
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Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
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8586
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Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
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8589
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For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
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15460
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All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
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15726
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Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
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14996
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Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
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15744
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We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
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15743
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Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
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15740
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I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
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16262
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Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
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15451
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I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
7031
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Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
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8572
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Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
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15464
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The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18433
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There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis]
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8604
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We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis]
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15739
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There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis]
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15563
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Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10723
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A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
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14499
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Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
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4038
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Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
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15399
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The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
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15732
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Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
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15733
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Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
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15734
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If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
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15516
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A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
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9655
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Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
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16290
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I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
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9653
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It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
9657
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You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
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15433
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Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
15750
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Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis]
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15749
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Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis]
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15748
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Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis]
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