Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, John Heil and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
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35 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21339
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We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil]
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21349
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Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil]
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21340
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Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil]
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18508
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Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
21348
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In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil]
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21351
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Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation [Heil]
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21344
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If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R [Heil]
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18532
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If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
18510
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We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
4603
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Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4617
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A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil]
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18522
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Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
4615
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Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil]
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18513
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Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil]
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4612
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Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
7007
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I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18540
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Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil]
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4587
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From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil]
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7015
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A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil]
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18533
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In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
18511
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Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
7042
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A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
4611
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The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
7023
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Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
21350
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If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
18523
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Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil]
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18524
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Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
7025
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Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
7034
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Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
7039
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How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7009
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Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil]
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7041
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Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil]
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18435
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Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
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18436
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Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
7032
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Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil]
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