Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Cynthia Macdonald, Bernard Linsky and Thomas Hobbes
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17 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
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7938
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Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C]
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8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
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7967
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Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
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16670
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Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
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21729
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Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
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16621
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Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes]
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7965
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Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
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7934
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Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
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7958
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Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C]
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7972
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Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
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7959
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How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C]
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7960
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Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
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16734
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The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
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7951
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Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
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7964
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How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
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17247
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The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
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7971
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Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
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7955
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Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C]
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