Combining Philosophers
Ideas for David S. Oderberg, Thomas Bayes and David M. Armstrong
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18 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
8505
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Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8529
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Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
4440
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'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
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8532
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Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
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4439
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'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4031
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It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
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8530
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Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
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8536
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We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
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4431
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'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
4433
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Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong]
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4432
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'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8531
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In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
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4436
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'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
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4434
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'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
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4435
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'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
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18371
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The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
4437
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'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong]
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4438
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'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong]
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