Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Galen, Robert Pasnau and Michael Devitt
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
9 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
|
16732
|
17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau]
|
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
|
16733
|
17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]
|
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
|
16662
|
The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau]
|
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
|
16767
|
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
|
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
|
16788
|
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
|
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
|
16738
|
Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau]
|
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
|
8502
|
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
|
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
|
8503
|
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
|
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
|
8501
|
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
|