Combining Philosophers
Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, D.H. Mellor and David M. Armstrong
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18 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
7024
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Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
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17679
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All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
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15550
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Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
15754
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Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
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18372
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We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong]
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8568
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A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18379
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The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong]
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18378
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Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
9478
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Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
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12677
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Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4034
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Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
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8535
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To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
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8564
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There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8537
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Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
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4444
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One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
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18373
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If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
8538
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Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
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4445
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If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong]
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