Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lycophron, Bertrand Russell and Ion
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27 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21341
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Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil]
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21534
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The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell]
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21540
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Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell]
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21562
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There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell]
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5371
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Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell]
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5407
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That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell]
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21576
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With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell]
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8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
14430
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If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell]
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10586
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'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell]
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14432
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'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell]
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8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / b. Equivalence relation
10585
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Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9127
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Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
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21575
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When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
6063
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Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
14327
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Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
5383
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Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell]
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4428
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Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell]
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5406
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Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell]
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4479
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All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
4427
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Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell]
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21710
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We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell]
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4030
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Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
5409
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Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
5408
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If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
4441
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'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
6440
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Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
4429
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If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell]
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