Combining Philosophers
Ideas for PG, C.B. Martin and David Lewis
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
13 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
|
15489
|
A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB]
|
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
|
15487
|
If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB]
|
|
9476
|
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
|
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
|
15463
|
All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
|
|
15120
|
Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
|
|
15554
|
A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
|
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
|
15479
|
Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB]
|
|
15488
|
Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB]
|
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
|
15469
|
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
|
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
|
15467
|
Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB]
|
|
15466
|
'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB]
|
|
15461
|
A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis]
|
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
|
8573
|
Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
|