Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Socrates, Cratylus and E.J. Lowe

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21 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
18353 Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
8273 Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8285 I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe]
4234 Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe]
4235 Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe]
4236 Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
8286 Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe]
8294 How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe]
8295 Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe]
8296 Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe]
18352 Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8288 Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe]
4197 The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
8293 Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
8307 Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
1652 Socrates did not consider universals or definitions as having separate existence, but Plato made Forms of them [Socrates, by Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
4232 Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4205 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe]
8967 Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
4233 If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]