Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stephen Mumford, Nicholas Bourbaki and Jerry A. Fodor

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29 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
14333 Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
14336 Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
14315 Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
14332 There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
2469 The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor]
14302 A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
7014 A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
9446 Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
14294 Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14310 Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
14317 I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
14316 If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
14313 All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
14318 Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14293 Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
14326 Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
14298 Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
14314 If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
14325 Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
12613 Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
14312 Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
14291 Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
14299 There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
2475 Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
9435 A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
9447 If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]