Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, Martin Heidegger and William of Ockham

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7 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

16779	Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham]
	Full Idea: When a piece of wood is divided in two halves, no new substance is generated. But there are now two substances, or the accidents of the two halves would be without a subject. They existed before hand, and were one piece of wood, but not in the same place.
	From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], IV.19), quoted by Richard S. Westfall - Never at Rest: a biography of Isaac Newton 26.2
	A reaction: A nice example, demonstrating that there are substances within substances, contrary to the view of Duns Scotus. If a substance is just a subject for properties, it is hard to know what to make of this case.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16757	Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham]
	Full Idea: It is clear to the senses that hot water, if left to its own nature, reverts to coldness; this coldness cannot be caused by anything other than the substantial form of the water.
	From: William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], III.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.4
	A reaction: Unfortunately this is very bad science (even for its time), but it shows how many scholastics treated hylomorphism as a very physical and causal theory.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object

16599	Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: Ockham regards Quantity as an entirely superfluous ontological category, …because matter is intrinsically extended.
	From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.4

16681	Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham]
	Full Idea: Matter is made to have a greater or lesser quantity not through its receiving any absolute accident, but through condensation and rarefaction alone. Parts come more or less close together, which can happen with local motion.
	From: William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320], I.13), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.1
	A reaction: This is Ockham at his most modern, rejecting the odd idea of Quantity in favour of a modern corpuscular view of the mere motions of matter.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects

15576	Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt]
	Full Idea: Heidegger tries to develop a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' ('wesen' as a verb).
	From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§25-7

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier

9109	If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham]
	Full Idea: If essence and existence were two things, then no contradiction would be involved if God preserved the essence of a thing in the world without its existence, or vice versa, its existence without its essence; both of which are impossible.
	From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], III,II,c,xxvii)
	A reaction: Not that William is using the concept of a supreme mind as a tool in argument. His denial of essence as something separable is presumably his denial of the Aristotelian view of universals, as well as of the Platonic view.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts

16792	If parts change, the whole changes [William of Ockham]
	Full Idea: That is not the same whole that does not have the same parts.
	From: William of Ockham (Commentary on the Sentences [1320], IV.13), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.2
	A reaction: In isolation, this is mereological essentialism (as Pasnau confirms), which is incredibly implausible, if I cease to be the same person when I cut one of my fingernails.