display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Your belief that you existed in the year 2000 is true; the belief of a segment of you that it then existed is false; so, by the indiscernibility of identicals, there must be two beliefs here. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.IV n20) | |
A reaction: Merricks may be begging the question here. But in the segment view there is nothing which can truly believe it existed a year ago, so therefore nothing here has continued existence, so the segments cannot be part of a single thing. |
19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Origin essentialists claim that parental union results in a person, and that person could not have resulted from any other union. However, if the fertilised egg undergoes twinning, at least one of the resultant persons is not the original person. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.V) | |
A reaction: Merricks says that therefore that origin could have just produced the second twin, rather than the original person. This is interesting, but doesn't seem to threaten the necessity of origin thesis. Once I'm here, I have that origin, despite my twin. |
6136 | Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks] |
Full Idea: I say we should endorse eliminativism about physical objects, because it offers the most plausible understanding of what occurs during the Sorites Game (eliminating grains of a thing one at a time). | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §2.II) | |
A reaction: That is one route to go in explaining the paradox (i.e. by saying there never was a 'heap' in the first place). I suspect a better route is to say that heaps really exist as natural phenomena, but they suffer from vague identity and borderline cases. |