Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Archimedes, Dale Jacquette and Achille Varzi

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8 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects

7685	An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette]
	Full Idea: To be an object is to be a predication subject, and to be this as opposed to that particular object, whether existent or not, is to have a distinctive combination of properties.
	From: Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 2)
	A reaction: The last part depends on Leibniz's Law. The difficulty is that two objects may only be distinguishable by being in different places, and location doesn't look like a property. Cf. Idea 5055.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta

7699	Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette]
	Full Idea: Roughly, numbers, sets and propositions are assumed to be abstract particulars, while properties, including qualities and relations, are usually thought to be universals.
	From: Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 9)
	A reaction: There is an interesting nominalist project of reducing all of these to particulars. Numbers to patterns, sets to their members, propositions to sentences, properties to causal powers, relations to, er, something else.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object

10661	'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
	Full Idea: The thesis known as 'composition is identity' is that identity is mereological composition; a fusion is just the parts counted loosely, but it is strictly a multitude and loosely a single thing.
	From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 4.3)
	A reaction: [He cites D.Baxter 1988, in Mind] It is not clear, from this simple statement, what the difference is between multitudes that are parts of a thing, and multitudes that are not. A heavy weight seems to hang on the notion of 'composed of'.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects

10647	Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
	Full Idea: The word 'part' can used whether it is attached, or arbitrarily demarcated, or gerrymandered, or immaterial, or unextended, or spatial, or temporal.
	From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1)

10651	If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
	Full Idea: Taking reflexivity as constitutive of the meaning of 'part' amounts to regarding identity as a limit case of parthood.
	From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1)
	A reaction: A nice thought, but it is horribly 'philosophical', and a long way from ordinary usage and common sense (which is, I'm sorry to say, a BAD thing).

10649	'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
	Full Idea: It seems obvious that 'part' stands for a partial ordering, a reflexive ('everything is part of itself'), antisymmetic ('two things cannot be part of each other'), and transitive (a part of a part of a thing is part of that thing) relation.
	From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1)
	A reaction: I'm never clear why the reflexive bit of the relation should be taken as 'obvious', since it seems to defy normal usage and common sense. It would be absurd to say 'I'll give you part of the cake' and hand you the whole of it. See Idea 10651.

10654	The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
	Full Idea: With a basic parthood relation, we can formally define various mereological predicates, such as overlap, underlap, proper part, over-crossing, under-crossing, proper overlap, and proper underlap.
	From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.2)
	A reaction: [Varzi offers some diagrams, but they need interpretation]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

10658	Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
	Full Idea: We might say that sameness of parts is not sufficient for identity, as some entities may differ exclusively with respect to the arrangement of the parts, as when we compare 'John loves Mary' with 'Mary loves John'.
	From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 3.2)
	A reaction: Presumably wide dispersal should also prevent parts from fixing wholes, but there is so much vagueness here that it is tempting to go for unrestricted composition, and then work back to the common sense position.