display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
8915 | How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen] |
Full Idea: It is unclear how we manage to refer determinately to abstract entities in a sense in which it is not unclear how we manage to refer determinately to other things. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Abstract Objects [2001], 'Way of Ex') | |
A reaction: This is where problems of abstraction overlap with problems about reference in language. Can we have a 'baptism' account of each abstraction (even very large numbers)? Will descriptions do it? Do abstractions collapse into particulars when we refer? |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Meinongian abstraction principles say that for any (suitably restricted) class of properties, there exists an abstract entity (arbitrary object, subsistent entity) that possesses just those properties. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 04) | |
A reaction: This is 'Meinongian' because there will be an object which is circular and square. The nub of the idea presumably resides in what is meant by 'restricted'. An object possessing every conceivable property is, I guess, a step too far. |