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17041
|
Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants and simple bodies like earth, fire, air, and water.
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From:
Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 192b09)
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A reaction:
Interestingly, he seems to include lives, and elements, but nothing in between, like planets or stones.
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590
|
Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Things are numerically one in matter, formally one in their account, generically one in their pattern of predication [genos], and one by analogy if related to a further one.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1016b30)
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A reaction:
Very subtle distinctions. What I like is that the notion of numerical unity is comprehensively tied to the notion of individual identity. 'To be is to be countable' may be wrong, but it is better than Quine's 'to be is to be the value of a variable'
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17842
|
Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
The reason why all things are unities is indivisibility. In some, it is indivisibility with regard to movement, in others with regard to thought and the account.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a35)
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A reaction:
This is puzzling, since Aristotle wasn't an atomist, and therefore thought that everything was endlessly divisible. He might better have said that unified things 'strongly resist division'.
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17839
|
Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Other things get to be unities by dint of the fact that the account [logos] of them is single, ...a thought about which is a single thought, ...which is an indivisible thought, ..which is a thought about a formally or numerically indivisible object.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052a28)
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A reaction:
This highlights the distinction between things that seem intrinsically unified, and things on which we bestow unity. But note that towards the end of the quotation Aristotle elides the two together.
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16172
|
Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
The only thing which is not predicated of some underlying thing is substance, while everything is predicated of it. But the same goes for substances too: there is something underlying them too, which they come from. Plants from seeds, for example.
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From:
Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 190b01)
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A reaction:
[compressed] I presume 'substance' here is 'ousia'. Aristotle's quest is to pin down 'that which lies under', but this shows that if he identified it, he wouldn't have located what is ultimate. The explanation of a plant extends beyond the plant.
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16623
|
We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
The underlying nature is an object of knowledge, by an analogy. For as bronze is to a statue, wood to a bed, or matter and the formless before receiving form to any thing which has form, so is the underlying nature of substance, the 'this' or existent.
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From:
Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 191a08)
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A reaction:
Scholastics were perfectly aware of this cautious approach. It is only the critics who jeer at Aristotelians for claiming to know all about the essences of things. Essence is like the Unmoved Mover, inferred but unknown.
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12076
|
Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt]
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Full Idea:
Aristotelian substance is prior in three ways: it is prior to nonsubstance in being separate, it is prior in definition, and it is prior in knowledge.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 2.4
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A reaction:
'Being separate' means it doesn't dependent on anything else, so it is prior because it is fundamental, in relations of ontological dependence.
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11284
|
It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
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Full Idea:
It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance', or 'proté ousia' as 'primary substance'. 'Substance' is a particular answer to the question 'What is proté ousia?' The Latin 'substantia' means 'that which lies under', translating 'to hupokeimenon'.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], subst) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.1
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A reaction:
This seems to be rather important in the exegesis of Aristotle's metaphysics, but Politis seems to hold a minority view, even though what he says here is very persuasive.
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11036
|
A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
A substance, in its most primary sense, is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or horse. The species in which things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as are the genera.
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From:
Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02a11)
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A reaction:
This distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' substances is characteristic of Aristotle's earlier metaphysical view, with the later view (more unified and Platonic) in the 'Metaphysics'.
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16084
|
Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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Full Idea:
In Categories a primary substance has ontological priority, where other things depend on its existence, ..but in Metaphysics he emphasizes conceptual priority, where the primary is what is understood through itself (a definable unity).
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Intro
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A reaction:
Interesting for my view of essence as rooted in explanation. It is the Metaphysics version that appeals to me. A metaphysics is constructed from our modes of understanding. 'Concavity' is his example of a primary unity.
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16140
|
Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
The concept of substance applies to secondary substances only with some deletions; ..it is not true that they have no subjects, and hence they are not ultimate subjects for all other elements of the ontology.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
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A reaction:
It increasingly strikes that to treat secondary substance (roughly, species) as essence is a shocking misreading of Aristotle. Frede says they are substances, because they do indeed 'underlie'.
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10965
|
In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
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Full Idea:
In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle changed his view, as in 'Categories' the substances, the basic realities, were particular items, notably individual men, horses, cabbages etc.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.178
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A reaction:
The charge is that having successfully rebelled against Plato, Aristotle gradually succumbed to his teacher's influence, and ended up with a more platonist view. For anti-platonists like myself, the 'Categories' seems to be the key text.
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8287
|
Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
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Full Idea:
In 'Categories' primary substances are individual concrete objects, such as a particular horse, whereas in 'Metaphysics' such things are combinations of matter and substantial form, with the latter being the primary substances.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 9.1
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A reaction:
Lowe claims there is no real difference. Aristotle came to think that matter was not part of primary substance, so the shift seems to be that substance was concrete, but then he decided it was abstract. Physicists will prefer 'Metaphysics'.
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11299
|
Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Things are said to be substance [ousia] because, far from being predicated of some subject, other things are predicated of them; in another way, for an intrinsic thing, it is the cause of being for it, as the soul is for the animal
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a13-23)
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A reaction:
This passage is used by M. Woods and others to argue that Aristotle has two different meanings for 'ousia' [substance, being]. Vasilis Politis argues against this view (pp.228). Aristotle is probably making two observations about a single thing.
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12060
|
Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
The essence (to ti en einai), whose account (logos) is a definition, is also said to be the substance (ousia) of the particular. So there are two accounts of 'ousia' - as ultimate subject (hupokeimenon), never predicated of others, or as a this (tode ti).
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a22-)
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A reaction:
This slightly muddling assertion seems to be a report of how people use 'ousia', rather than Aristotle's theory. Attempts to translate this idea into English make fascinating reading! Hang on to the Greek, or you'll never get the hang of it!
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10941
|
A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
The substance of a particular thing is variously held to be that which it was to be that thing, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject, which is that of which other entities are said, but is never itself being said-of anything else.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028b30)
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A reaction:
This formulation sounds worryingly verbal to me, but I don't suppose Aristotle meant it entirely that way.
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11290
|
Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
It may seem that matter is substance, but this cannot be so, because what we think to be the central features of substance are separability and thisness. Then it seems more plausible to say that the form and the composite are substance than matter is.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a27)
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A reaction:
This is an important basic point, because modern materialism takes matter (of some sort) to be basic, but Aristotle seems to take identity (and form and essence) to be basic, and matter to be merely at their service.
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12093
|
Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle's argument is that if we understand the substance of a thing to be that which unifies it, and if we understand that a universal is predicated of many things, then we will see that a universal cannot be the substance of a thing.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b1-15) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle
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|
A reaction:
Presumably if universals are predicated of something, or something 'partakes' of the universal, then we want to know about the 'something', not about the universal. But do we end up with substances being 'bare particulars'?
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11233
|
In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis]
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Full Idea:
The claim that 'proté ousia' is substance is a particular answer to 'What is proté ousia?', so 'substance' is not what it means. The Latin 'substantia' translates Aristotle's 'to hupokeimenon' ('that which lies under').
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.3
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A reaction:
It seems that in 'Categories' Aristotle identified 'primary being' with 'that which lies under', but the notion of 'essence' comes into the picture in 'Metaphysics'. Big problems of textual exegesis.
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16174
|
A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
What it is to be shapeless is different from what it is to be bronze. …An underlying nature is related to substance as, in general, matter (which is to say, something shapeless), before it gains shape, is to something with shape.
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From:
Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 190b39-)
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A reaction:
This is an interesting take on the modern problem that the bronze seems to be a separate 'object' from the statue. If bronze is amorphous stuff, it has no shape, presumably because it has no significant shape.
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16096
|
Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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Full Idea:
The form of a statue depends upon bronze (or some similar stuff) for its existence, while the bronze has no comparable need for the form of the statue. The bronze can exist before acquiring the form, and continue after the form has been removed.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Z.3) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1
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A reaction:
Some would cite this as precisely the modal difference between them that seems to suggest they are two objects. I would say that their different status shows that they shouldn't be thought of as two 'objects'. An object with two natures?
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