Combining Philosophers

Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, George Boolos and Sebastian Gardner

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3 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos]
     Full Idea: I am rather a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence. Smaller numbers, sets and functions don't offend my sense of reality.
     From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.128)
     A reaction: The great Boolos is rather hard to disagree with, but I disagree. Logicians love abstract objects, indeed they would almost be out of a job without them. It seems to me they smuggle them into our ontology by redefining either 'object' or 'exists'.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos]
     Full Idea: We twentieth century city dwellers deal with abstract objects all the time, such as bank balances, radio programs, software, newspaper articles, poems, mistakes, triangles.
     From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.129)
     A reaction: I find this claim to be totally question-begging, and typical of a logician. The word 'object' gets horribly stretched in these discussions. We can create concepts which have all the logical properties of objects. Maybe they just 'subsist'?
Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
     Full Idea: Objects, as distinct from entities of other types (properties, relations or, more generally, functions of different types and levels), just are what (actual or possible) singular terms refer to.
     From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.1)
     A reaction: I find this view very bizarre and hard to cope with. It seems either to preposterously accept the implications of the way we speak into our ontology ('sakes'?), or preposterously bend the word 'object' away from its normal meaning.