12498
|
Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
We come to the ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting combinations of simple ideas that exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence of that substance.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.23.03)
|
|
A reaction:
This is Locke's concept of essence, as the source which gives rise to the other properties of a thing. Locke waxes sarcastic about this 'I know not what' in things, but he never actually denies it. He just thinks it is beyond our grasp.
|
12520
|
The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
When I enquire into the real essence, from which all the properties flow, I cannot discover it: the farthest I can go, is only to presume that it being nothing but body, its essence must be the figure, size and connection of its solid parts.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.31.06)
|
|
A reaction:
I say we have now discovered the essence of gold (for example), and that 'figure, size and connection' of parts is quite a good account of what we have discovered, namely the 79 protons, the neutrons, and the electron shell, with forces.
|
16038
|
Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
|
|
Full Idea:
It may be that for Locke 'real essences' and 'internal constitution' cannot be synonymous because, according to Locke, real essences are unknowable, but internal constitutions are knowable.
|
|
From:
report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.23.12) by Jan-Erik Jones - Real Essence §4.4
|
|
A reaction:
[He cites Susanna Goodin 1998; evidence for the first half is 4.6.5 and 12, and for the second is 2.23.12] One suggestion [citing 4.6.11] is that essence includes the powers, but constitution is the material components.
|
15992
|
Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
Anyone who observes their different qualities can hardly doubt that many of the individuals, called by the same name, are, in their internal constitution, as different from one another as several of those which are ranked under different specific names.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.10.20)
|
|
A reaction:
I take this to agree with Aristotle, and disagree with the medieval scholastic view that essences pertain to species. Locke and I think that the so-called essences of natural kinds and sortal classes are just loose inductive generalisations.
|
15990
|
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
|
|
A reaction:
This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.
|
12539
|
If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
If anyone thinks that a man, a horse, an animal, a plant, are distinguished by real essences made by nature, he must think nature to be very liberal, making one for body, another for an animal, and another for a horse, all bestowed upon Bucephalus.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.32)
|
|
A reaction:
This is a powerful argument in favour of individual essences, and strongly against kind essences. Locke at his best, I would say.
|
11155
|
Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
Essence may be taken for the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally in substances, unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their essence.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03.15)
|
|
A reaction:
Fine cites this as following the Aristotelian definitional account of essence, rather than the account in terms of necessities. Locke goes on to distinguish 'real' from 'nominal' essence.
|
12560
|
We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
What other qualities necessarily co-exist with a substance we cannot know, unless we can discover their natural dependence; which in their primary qualities we can go but a very little way in, and in secondary qualities we know no connexion at all.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.06.07)
|
|
A reaction:
His concept of essence is precisely that which gives rise to the collection of a thing's properties, so his doubts here are consistent. I take the modern position to be an optimist reading of Locke, that actually we can identify the substances.
|
16028
|
Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
|
|
Full Idea:
For Locke, a real essence is what makes something what it is, and in the case of physical substances, it is the underlying physical cause of the object's observable qualities.
|
|
From:
report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Jan-Erik Jones - Real Essence Intro
|
|
A reaction:
A helpful summary from a Locke expert. Is 'what it is' its type, or its individuality? Is the 'underlying cause' sufficiently coherent, or is it just a tangle of unseen activities?
|
12305
|
Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi]
|
|
Full Idea:
For Locke the real essence of a thing is a set of properties which determine all the other properties of that thing [3.3.15], so essential properties are not retained during any change, and there is no real knowledge of the essence of things.
|
|
From:
report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03) by Irving M. Copi - Essence and Accident p.712
|
|
A reaction:
Although I like the Aristotelian view, this account of Locke's must be taken seriously. Compare Idea 12304. If Aristotelian essence founds scientific knowledge, then a thing with varying behaviour has a varying essence.
|
15985
|
It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is as impossible that two things, partaking exactly of the same real essence, should have different properties, as that two figures partaking in the same real essence of a circle, should have different properties.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03.17)
|
|
A reaction:
Two circles could be of relatively different size, so we deduce from that that size is not essential. Hence essence of gold seems to be defined as those respects in which two samples of gold never vary. But that might be superficial…
|
12534
|
We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
We can never know what are the precise number of properties depending on the real essence of gold, any one of which failing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real essence of gold itself.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.19)
|
|
A reaction:
Excellent. This is a splendid reason why we should not make the mistake of thinking that essence consists of necessary properties.
|
13434
|
In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
Let any one examine his own thoughts, and he will find, that as soon as he supposes or speaks of essential, the consideration of some species, or the complex idea, signified by some general name, comes into his mind.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.04)
|
|
A reaction:
This wouldn't stop an individual having a distinct essence, if essences are distinctive combinations of these species qualities. Thus if my dog is particularly ferocious, it combines the species of dog and the species of ferocious in a unique way.
|
12812
|
Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
This I do say, that there are real constitutions in things from whence simple ideas flow, which we observe combin'd in them. But we distinguish particular substances into sorts or genera not by real essences or constitutions, but by observed simple ideas.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Letters to William Molyneux [1692], 1693.01.20)
|
|
A reaction:
This is the clearest statement I can find of Locke's position on essences. He is totally committed to their reality, but strongly aware of the empirical constraints which keep us from direct knowledge of them. He would be amazed by modern discoveries.
|
12306
|
'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi]
|
|
Full Idea:
Locke was more interested in 'nominal essences'. ...The abstract idea of various particular substances that resemble each other ..determines a sort or a species, the 'nominal essence', for "everything contained in that idea is essential to that sort".
|
|
From:
report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Irving M. Copi - Essence and Accident p.712
|
|
A reaction:
[He refers us to Locke 'Essay' 3.3, and others] This seems to be the sortals espoused by Wiggins, so is he more of a Lockean than an Aristotelian? He's a slippery fish. Knowing the sort is said by Locke to be the key to knowledge.
|
13433
|
Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
Essence, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to sorts; ..take but away the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names, and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.04)
|
|
A reaction:
The claim seems to be that if you refer to 'the dog', you instantly see its doggy essence, but if you refer to 'Fido' you see no such thing. But he is confusing the name with the idea. 'Fido' reveals no essence, but my idea of my beloved dog does.
|
12557
|
Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
Our ideas of substance being supposed copies, and referred to archetypes within us, must still be taken from something that does or has existed; they must not consist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our thoughts.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.04.12)
|
|
A reaction:
This is a begrudging concession from Locke, who has been rather sarcastic about our supposed knowledge of substance. His is a realist about the physical world, and rightly says that our ideas are shaped by externals. We just don't have the evidence.
|
12525
|
The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
The essence of a triangle lies in a very little compass, consists in a very few lines; ...so I imagine it is in substances, their real essences lie in a little compass, though the properties flowing from that internal constitution are endless.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.32.24)
|
|
A reaction:
This is the clearest evidence I can find that Locke firmly believed in real essence of substances, despite all his sarcasm about anyone who claimed to know what they are. He evidently knows at least one real essence, namely that of the triangle.
|
13431
|
A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
A space between three lines is the real as well as nominal essence of a Triangle; it being not only the abstract idea to which the name is annexed, but the very Essentia or Being of the thing itself, that foundation from which all its properties flow.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03.18)
|
|
A reaction:
Highly significant, coming from a famous doubter of essences. It seems to me that Locke would accept that we know have the essences of innumberable physical entities, which seemed impossible in his day.
|
12547
|
We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke]
|
|
Full Idea:
Though we see the yellow, and upon trial find the weight, malleableness, fusibility and fixedness of gold, yet because no one of these has evident dependence or necessary connexion with the other, we cannot know if four are there, the fifth will be also.
|
|
From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.03.14)
|
|
A reaction:
Thus it is that knowledge of necessary properties cannot lead us to knowledge of essence, because explanatory dependence is in the opposite direction. The point of knowing essences is to gain increased powers of prediction.
|