Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Epicurus, Pindar and Theophrastus

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3 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Epicurus said that body was conceived as an aggregate of shape and size and resistance and weight.
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE])
     A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.257] Note that this is how we 'conceive' them. They might be intrinsically different, except that Epicurus is pretty much a phenomenalist.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Properties are known by their peculiar forms of application and comprehension, in close accompaniment with the aggregate [of atoms], which is given the predicate 'body' by reference to the aggregate conception.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 69)
     A reaction: There is an interesting hint here of how to think of properties (as both applying and comprehended in some distinctive way), and a suggestion that there is something conventional about bodies, depending on how we conceive them.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Impermanent properties do not have the nature of an entire thing, which we call a body when we grasp it in aggregate, nor the nature of permanent accompaniments without which it is not possible to conceive of a body.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 70)
     A reaction: Epicurus doesn't discuss essences, but this seems to commit to the basic Aristotelian idea, that there there are some properties which actually bestow identity, and then others which are optional for that thing. The 'conception' is always mentioned.