Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Eucleides, Saul A. Kripke and Gilbert Harman

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9 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence

5450	For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
	Full Idea: Kripke makes the origin of an organism essential to it, according to Putnam the fundamental physical properties of a thing are essential, Wiggins sees an organism's essence in belonging to a particular kind, etc.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.179
	A reaction: This is helpful for seeing where the problems remain, if you embrace essentialism (as I feel inclined to do). It is vital to remember Putnam's point, that we could suddenly discover that cats are alien robots. This seems to undermine Kripke and Wiggins.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

17055	Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
	Full Idea: It is part of the nature of gold as we have it to be an element with atomic number 79.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
	A reaction: The word 'nature' directly invokes Aristotle's concept of an essence. Scientific essentialism arises from the idea that by discovering the atomic number, we have somehow 'arrived' at the essence, and enquiry is reaching its terminus.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

16997	An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
	Full Idea: When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1)
	A reaction: This seems to equate essence with necessary properties, which is the view attacked nicely be Fine in 1994. I take essence (in Aristotle's sense) to be quite different from necessary properties (in being non-trivial, for example).

17045	De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
	Full Idea: De re modality is an object having essential properties.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
	A reaction: [Plucked out of context] It is because Kripke says there are necessities about things, and not just about statements about things, that he has caused a revival of essentialism. Fine has famously said modality depends on essence.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

17030	Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
	Full Idea: Important properties of an object need not be essential, unless 'importance' is used as a synonym for essence.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 2)
	A reaction: Kripke's examples are the writings of Aristotle and the actions of Hitler, but these don't strike me as being 'properties' of those people. They are not intrinsic. Kripke, of course, is concerned with how we identify them, not who they actually are.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species

16955	Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
	Full Idea: Kripke stresses that membership of a single animal species requires identity or similarity of internal structure. In my view, what matters is genetic affinity - a common descent. Internal structure is merely a clue.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Michael Dummett - Could There Be Unicorns? 2
	A reaction: The crucial test question would be whether we can make a tiger artificially (even constructing the DNA). I would say that if you make a tiger, that's a tiger, so Kripke is right and Dummett is wrong. The species is what it is, not where it came from.

16996	Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
	Full Idea: Suppose Nixon actually turned out to be an automaton. That might happen. But that is a question about our knowledge. The question of whether he might not have been a human being, given that he is one, is not a question about knowledge.
	From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1)
	A reaction: Given that you are sitting, might you be standing? Yes. Given that you are human, might you be non-human? No. Maybe!

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences

13971	Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
	Full Idea: Kripke's first (good) route to the necessary a posteriori is based on the idea that certain properties of objects that they can be known to have only a posteriori, may be known a priori to be essential properties of anything that has them.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Scott Soames - Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori p.180
	A reaction: Interesting, and a key issue. I think this is precisely where I disagree with the Kripkean view of necessities. Logicians want to know a priori what is essential for identity, but scientists want to know what makes things tick. See Kripke on pain.

12100	An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
	Full Idea: For Kripke an object's essence simply consists of its necessary properties. ...His essential properties of individual objects follow from our intuitions about their identity. ...They are of three sorts: of origin, of sortals, and of material.
	From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 6 n3
	A reaction: This is because Kripke is only interested in identity, whereas Aristotle is interested in explanation. The sorts are efficient, formal, material. Big Q: could Aristotle's account of essence do all the work that is required of essences by Kripke?