display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
14 ideas
14487 | The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson] |
Full Idea: The existence conditions for ordinary objects are established by our practices, and they are quite minimal, so it is rather obvious that they are fulfilled, and so there are such things. | |
From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 09.3) | |
A reaction: This is one of her main arguments. The same argument would have worked for witches or ghosts in certain cultures. |
14485 | Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson] |
Full Idea: I do not argue that ordinary objects are indispensable, but rather that they are (nearly) unavoidable. | |
From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 09) | |
A reaction: Disappointing, given the blurb and title of the book, but put in those terms it will be hard to disagree. Clearly ordinary objects figure in the most useful way for us to talk. I wonder whether we have a clear ontology of 'simples' in which they vanish. |
21651 | It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Thomasson argues that the existence of ordinary objects follows analytically from the distribution of simples, assuming that there are any simples. It is an analytic truth that if there are simples arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair. | |
From: report of Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007]) by Thomas Hofweber - Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics 07.3 | |
A reaction: But how do you distinguish when simples are arranged nearly chair-wise from the point where they click into place as actually chair-wise? What is the criterion? |
14486 | Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson] |
Full Idea: The eliminativist cannot claim to have 'discovered' some real existence conditions for chairs beyond those entailed by the semantic rules associated with ordinary use of the word 'chair'. | |
From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 09.3) | |
A reaction: It is difficult to understand atoms arranged 'chairwise' or 'baseballwise' if you don't already know what a chair or a baseball are. |
14467 | Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson] |
Full Idea: Objections to ordinary objects are the Causal Redundancy claim (objects lack causal powers), the Anti-Colocation view (statues and lumps overlap), Sorites arguments, a more economical ontology, or a more scientific ontology. | |
From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: [my summary of two paragraphs] The chief exponents of these views are Van Inwagen and Merricks. Before you glibly accept ordinary objects, you must focus on producing a really strict ontology. These arguments all have real force. |
14479 | To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson] |
Full Idea: The conventionalist faces paradox if they hold that conventions are logically prior to people (since this plurality requires conventions of individuation), and people are logically prior to conventions (if they make up the conventions). | |
From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03.3) | |
A reaction: [Sidelle is the spokesman for conventionalism] The best defence would be to deny the second part, and say that conventions emerge from whatever is there, but only conventions can individuate the bits of what is there. |
14481 | Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson] |
Full Idea: In a 'modally plenitudinous' ontology, wherever there is an object at all, there are objects with intrinsic modal properties instantiating every consistent modal profile. | |
From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03.5) | |
A reaction: [She cites K.Bennett, Hawley, Rea, Sidelle] I love this. At last a label for the view I have been espousing. I am a Modal Plenitudinist. I must get a badge made. |
21981 | The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel] |
Full Idea: As intuitively accepted by Spinoza without a previous mediation by dialectic, substance is as it were a dark shapeless abyss which engulfs all definite content as radically null, and produces from itself nothing that has a positive substance of its own. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], I §151Z p.215), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.6 | |
A reaction: This seems to be an expression of idealism, since only what is conceptualised can exist. |
14482 | If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson] |
Full Idea: An objection to the idea that statues are not identical to material lumps of stuff is the proliferation of instances of properties shared by those objects. If the mass of the statue is 500kg, and the mass of the lump is 500kg, do we have 1000kg? | |
From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 04.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed; she cites Rea 1997 and Zimmerman 1995] To wriggle out of this we would have to understand 'object' rather differently, so that an independent mass is not intrinsic to it. I leave this as an exercise for the reader. |
14483 | Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson] |
Full Idea: The 'grounding problem' is that given all that the statue and the lump have in common, what could possibly ground their different modal properties? | |
From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 04.4) | |
A reaction: Their modal properties are, of course, different, because only one of them could survive squashing. Thomasson suggests their difference of sort, but I'm not sure what that means, separately from what they actually are. |
15637 | Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel] |
Full Idea: The entire second part of the 'Logic', the doctrine of Essence, deals with the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §65) | |
A reaction: He is referring to his book 'Science of Logic'. I don't really understand this, but that essence 'posits' the unity of a thing catches my attention. |
15613 | Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel] |
Full Idea: In genuine cognition ...an object determines itself from within itself, and does not acquire its predicates in an external way. If we proceed by way of predication, the spirit gets the feeling that the predicates cannot exhaust what they are attached to. | |
From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §28 Add) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a glimpse of Hegel's notoriously difficult account of essence. Place this alongside Locke's distinction between Nominal and Real essences. Once we have the predicates, we want to grasp their source. |
14476 | Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson] |
Full Idea: Identity claims are only well-formed and truth-evaluable if the terms flanking the statement are associated with a certain category of entity each is to refer to, which disambiguates the reference and identity-criteria. | |
From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03) | |
A reaction: The first of her two criteria for identity. She is buying the full Wiggins package. |
14477 | Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson] |
Full Idea: Identity claims are only true if the entities referred to are of the same category, and meet the criteria of identity appropriate for things of that category. | |
From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03) | |
A reaction: This may be a little too optimistic about having a set of clear-cut and reasonably objective categories to work with, but attempts at establishing metaphysical categories have not gone especially well. |