display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
| 8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: As Locke clearly understood, one must first have a clear conception of what kind of object one is dealing with in order to extract a criterion of identity for objects of that kind from that conception. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3) | |
| A reaction: Archaeologist face objects which they can number, remember and take pride in, without having a clue what kind of thing they are dealing with. The two processes may not be entirely distinct. |
| 8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: One venerable tradition, exemplified in Aquinas, has it that matter is the 'principle of individuation', that is, that all that can be guaranteed to distinguish two concrete thing of the same kind is the different matter of which they are composed. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be 'identity-conditions' rather than 'individuation', according to Idea 7926. The problem would be how to identify that particular matter, apart from its composing that particular object. Replacing planks on a ship seems unimportant. |
| 13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Any individual thing must be a thing of some general kind - because, at the very least, it must belong to some ontological category. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2) | |
| A reaction: Where does the law that 'everything must have a category' come from? I'm baffled by remarks of this kind. Where do we get the categories from? From observing the individuals. So which has priority? Not the categories. Is God a kind? |
| 4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The Identity of Indiscernibles (no two objects can possess exactly the same properties) is not the same as Leibniz's Law (what is true of a thing is true of what is identical with that thing). | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.62) | |
| A reaction: Two things can't be the same because we can't discern the difference, which may be our inadequacy. But if they actually have identical properties, it is hard to see how they could be different. A universe with just two perfect spheres is couterexample. |