Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Tuomas E. Tahko and Barbara Vetter

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4 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
     Full Idea: I can understand the notion of real definition as applying to (some) abstact entities, but I have no idea how to apply it to a concrete object such as Socrates or myself.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §1)
     A reaction: She is objecting to Kit Fine's account of essence, which is meant to be clearer than the normal account of essences based on necessities. Aristotle implies that definitions get fuzzy when you reach the level of the individual.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
     Full Idea: The modal account was meant, I take it, to make the notion of essence less mysterious by basing it on the supposedly better understood notion of necessity.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §1)
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19030 Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter]
     Full Idea: Not every feature of an individual's origin is plausibly considered necessary, so we can distinguish two questions: 'why origin, rather than development?', and 'why these particular features of origin?'.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.2)
     A reaction: [she cites P. Mackie 1998] The point is that exactly where someone was born doesn't seem vital. If it is nothing more than that every contingent object must have an origin, that is not very exciting.
19040 We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter]
     Full Idea: The plausibility of the necessity of origin is a symptom of our general tendency to think of possibility in terms of the 'branching model' - that unactualised possibilities must branch off from actuality, at some point.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.9)
     A reaction: [she cites P. Mackie 1998] It is hard to see how we could flatly deny some possibilities which had absolutely no connection with actuality, and were probably quite unimaginable for us.