display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
17188 | A thing is unified if its parts produce a single effect [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: If a number of individuals so unite in one action that they are all simultaneously the cause of one effect, I consider them all, so far, as one individual thing. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Def 7) | |
A reaction: Interesting. If a mob burn down a town, is that one effect, making the mob one thing? If a ball breaks a window, is that one effect, or a multitude of knock-on effects? Spinoza's view is very coarse-grained. |
5639 | Spinoza implies that thought is impossible without the notion of substance [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Without the notion of substance, according to Spinoza, thought itself becomes impossible. | |
From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy §5.2 | |
A reaction: Spinoza's strategy here looks like the right way to approach metaphysics. To what extent is it possible to change our conceptual scheme? Quine seems to imply that there is no limit; Davidson seems to imply that it is impossible. |
21857 | Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord] |
Full Idea: For Spinoza a substance is not a 'thing', but the power of actualising its own existence. | |
From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Pr 08) by Beth Lord - Spinoza's Ethics 1 P11 | |
A reaction: Does this say anything? |
4813 | Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: By substance I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Def 3) | |
A reaction: A striking blurring of epistemology and ontology. He eventually settles for it being a concept rather than a fact of nature. It still begs a thousand questions, but it probably leads to monads and logical atoms. |
14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
Full Idea: We cannot accept the existence of vague objects, according to Evans's argument that there cannot be indeterminacy of identity. ...From the assumption that it is indeterminate whether a = b, we conclude, determinately, that it's not the case that a = b. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by Amie L. Thomasson - Ordinary Objects 05.6 | |
A reaction: I think we should keep intrinsic identity separate from identity between entities. A cloud can be clearly identified, while being a bit fuzzy. It is only when you ask whether we saw the same cloud that Evans's argument seems relevant. |