Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Timothy Williamson and Gottlob Frege

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5 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

21630	If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson]
	Full Idea: If objects can have fuzzy spatial boundaries, surely they can have fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries too.
	From: Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 9.2)
	A reaction: Fair point. I think there is a distinction between parts of the thing, such as its edges, being fuzzy, and the whole thing being fuzzy, in the temporal case.

9891	The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
	Full Idea: The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary.
	From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws) [1903], §160), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.22
	A reaction: Nothing I have read about vagueness has made me doubt Frege's view of this, although precisification might allow you to do logic with vague concepts without having to finally settle where the actual boundaries are.

9388	Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]
	Full Idea: Of any concept, we must require that it have a sharp boundary. Of any object it must hold either that it falls under the concept or it does not. We may not allow a third case in which it is somehow indeterminate whether an object falls under a concept.
	From: Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914], p.229), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts p.1 n1
	A reaction: This is the voice of the classical logician, which has echoed by Russell. I'm with them, I think, in the sense that logic can only work with precise concepts. The jury is still out. Maybe we can 'precisify', without achieving total precision.

6861	What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
	Full Idea: The problem of vagueness is the problem of what logic is correct for vague concepts, and correspondingly what notions of truth and falsity are applicable to vague statements (does one need a continuum of degrees of truth, for example?).
	From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.153)
	A reaction: This certainly makes vagueness sound like one of the most interesting problems in all of philosophy, though also one of the most difficult. Williamson's solution is that we may be vague, but the world isn't.

9602	Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
	Full Idea: The constraints of common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness.
	From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After)
	A reaction: Wiliamson has described himself (in my hearing) as a 'rottweiller realist', but presumably the problem of vagueness interests a lot of people precisely because it pushes us away from common sense and classical logic.