display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
11 ideas
16602 | Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: What marks the rise of the corpuscularian movement is not just the rejection of form, but the rejection of matter as dependent on form. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 04.5) | |
A reaction: The point was that matter required form to have any kind of actual existence, but now matter can stand on its own. |
16612 | Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Hylomorphism admits of an alternative formulation, as an explanatory schema at a different level of analysis, not competing with corpuscular-mechanistic theory, but accounting for abstract features of the world - notably unity and endurance of substances. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau is clearly sympathetic. As a view of why normal objects have unity and persist over time it is almost the only decent theory around. Hawley, for example, struggles to explain how 'stages' of a thing are linked. Classical mereology is silly. |
16613 | Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Scholastics lost their grip on hylomorphism as a metaphysical theory, conceiving of it as a concrete, physical hypothesis about causal forces. Once form and matter were made subject to empirical research, their days were inevitably numbered. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau seems to make a sharp distinction between science, and a separate realm he labels 'metaphysical'. You can't keep causation out of Aristotelian hylomorphism. The defence is that it is at a higher level of generality than science. |
16747 | Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The conception of form as somehow substantial took on new life among scholastic Aristotelians, and was developed in ways that Aristotle himself never suggested. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.1) | |
A reaction: This is music to we modern neo-Aristotelians, because scholasticism was rightly dumped in the 17th C, but we can go back and start again from what The Philosopher actually said. |
16759 | Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The whole scholastic conception of substantial form came to have more and more in common with an Aristotelian efficient cause. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.2) | |
A reaction: Aristotle, of course, identified the form with the 'formal cause [aitia]', which is the shape of the statue, rather than the efficient cause, which is the sculptor. |
16748 | Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Aquinas subscribes to the unitarian doctrine that a single substance has just a single substantial form, but authors like Scotus subscribe to a plurality of substantial forms. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.1) | |
A reaction: The Scotists seem to think that qualities themselve can have forms. I take it that Aristotle would have agreed with Aquinas. |
16671 | Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: On one version of Quantity realism it is what makes a body have parts; on another version, it is what makes the body's parts be spread out in a continuous and unified way. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 14.1) |
16596 | A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: A completely bare substratum seems not just incoherent but also unable to carry out the function for which it is intended - to be a substratum. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 03.3) |
16579 | There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The substratum thesis says …perhaps there is a different subject for different kinds of changes, and perhaps what endures through one kind of change will be corrupted by another. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
16584 | If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: When the substratum thesis is grounded on the idea that the ingredients must endure through the change, if they are to play a causal role, then it is natural to suppose that quite a lot of the ingredients must endure. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) | |
A reaction: Aristotle sharply distinguishes alteration from substantial change, but as the substrate gets thinner, the boundary between those two would blur. |
16580 | A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The 'conservation thesis' about substrates says that there is a single, most basic substrate that endures through every material change, something we call 'prime matter'. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |